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The economic changes and integration 
efforts that had to be made in order to bring 
about the recent reunification of the two 
Germanies were vast and complex. The eco-
nomic systems of East and West Germany were 
so very different that it would have been impos-
sible to come to a compromise had East 
Germany not accepted the system of the West. 
According to historian Mary Fulbrook, "The 
most important factor which led to the unifi-
cation of the two Germanies was economic." 
(Fulbrook, p. 84) She takes this position 
because the economy of the German 
Democratic Republic (East Germany) was in 
such a terrible state that an economic crisis was 
in the making if it was to try to compete with 
the West. Also, the migration of people from 
East to West Germany after the dismantling of 
the wall was burdensome on the West because 
West Germany did not have jobs or living space 
1The author wishes to express appreciation to Robert 
Lingenfelter for helpful comments on this paper. 
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for all those migrating. Unification and a make-
over of the East seemed inevitable to insure the 
security and stability of both sides. 
The economic unification of East and West 
Germany was a mammoth project that is still 
going on today. The integration of the two sys-
tems involved the privatization of many east-
ern enterprises, a union of the banking systems, 
special care to limit unemployment, a 
rearrangement of property rights, and a huge 
influx of money and capital from the West to 
the East. Another great economic concern was 
the change in monetary policy and the curren-
cy reform, both of which had the potential to 
cause major difficulties in both East and West 
Germany. The immense need for financing 
from West Germany was also a problem because 
the West Germans were not necessarily in the 
position to take on such a huge financial 
responsibility. Unification also affected the 
European Community and Germany's role in 
it, including the establishment of the new 
European currency and the continuation of 
trade. Lastly, the international community was 
affected with respect to trade, German foreign 
policy, NATO, German competitiveness, and the 
foreign debt. 
In this essay I explain what happened to the 
economy in Germany as a result of reunification, 
and what effects this had on other parts of the 
world. Even though the differences between the 
East and West were vast and complex and the 
West had to take on a great burden to help the 
East, reunification seems to have been success-
ful so far. The German people are working hard 
to make this work and that is the main require-
ment: a willingness of the people to change and 
adapt to help their nation succeed. 
West and East Germany before 
Reunification 
Before reunification the West German 
economy was a social market economy, as all of 
Germany is today. There is basically a free mar-
ket with some state interference. Private own-
ership of the means of production and of indus-
try is the accepted norm. A method of 
decision-making in business called co-deter-
mination is used where the workers, or repre-
sentatives of the workers, have a voice in deci-
sions. (Fulbrook, p. 48) Industrial unions, with 
one union per industry, are in place to protect 
workers' rights; but employment is not guar-
anteed, and women are not a highly represent-
ed group in the work force. The major trading 
partners of West Germany were, and still are, 
the countries of the European Community. 
Compared to East Germany, West Germany 
enjoyed higher living standards and a higher 
GOP, but there was a more unequal distribution 
of income. The "economic miracle" that had 
happened after World War II to make West 
Germany competitive economically had worked 
wonders, and West Germany was still a great 
economic force in world affairs at the time of 
reunification when a successful and strong uni-
fied Germany took its place. In the East the 
economic situation was much different. The 
East German economy was a socialist system 
installed by the communists when they took 
control of East Germany after World War II. 
Public ownership of everything engendered col-
lectivism and centralization. Because many 
enterprises were state-owned monopolies, they 
were less efficient than their Western counter-
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parts. There was little incentive for people to 
work hard because the government took care 
of and controlled many facets of life. Even 
prices were set by the government, thus caus-
ing a "distorted price-system"- i.e., a price 
system not controlled by supply and demand. 
(Grosser, p. 109) Productivity was low because 
there was disguised unemployment, which 
meant that many of the people working were 
not needed to perform the work being done. 
Little technological development, outdat-
ed capital stock, and a lack of competition were 
three major problems affecting East Germany. 
To a large degree these were caused by the lack 
of incentive on the part of Easterners to exper-
iment with more productive techniques and to 
improve production. A single trade union exist-
ed in East Germany for all workers, but this was 
not really a workers' union. It was more a vehi-
cle used by the SED (the Socialist Unity Party) 
to espouse its policies and maintain control 
over the people. (Fulbrook, p. 51) The SED was 
a party formed in Aprill946 through a merger 
of the KPD (the East German Communist 
Party) and the SPD (the Social Democratic 
Party). Employment was guaranteed, but this 
would come to be a problem after unification 
when people who were used to being guaran-
teed a job were laid off. East German trade was 
mainly with the other socialist countries, par-
ticularly the Soviet Union. Even with this trade, 
the East tried to import as little as possible and 
produce everything on its own, even if this 
meant goods would cost more. Firms tried to 
produce all of their own inputs (Giersch, pp. 
258-59), and conglomerates and monopolies did 
not specialize and therefore did not benefit from 
comparative advantage. 
Some problems that resulted from the 
economic system in pre-unification East 
Germany were a low GOP per capita and hence 
a low standard of living for most citizens. The 
East German mark was not convertible into for-
eign currencies so East Germans had difficulty 
buying foreign goods. They could not buy West 
German goods unless they had the coveted West 
German deutsche mark. East German citizens 
had to endure this low standard of living and 
this difficult life because they were effectively 
under the control of the Soviet Union. There 
were many problems with the system that were 
disguised in the state-of-the-economy reports 
from the East German government, but no one 
really knew just how bad it was until after uni-
fication. It took the integration of the two 
Germanies to show the depth of the troubles 
that the East was experiencing. 
Currency Conversion 
Economic union was seen as an important 
beginning point in the unification process 
because many economists and politicians 
thought that it could be used as an impetus to 
full political and social union. According to his-
torian Dieter Grosser, "As soon as the monetary 
and economic union was implemented, the 
CDR's monetary, fiscal , and economic policy 
would be controlled by Bonn, making full and 
formal reunification the inevitable next step." 
(Grosser, p. 27) 
The steps in German monetary unification 
began in 1990. In January of that year, a 
German-German Economic Commission was 
set up to deal with economic and financial mat-
ters concerning the East and West. Then on 
February 7 a cabinet committee on German 
unity was established to deal with the econom-
ic challenges and problems. Finally, on May 18 
the German-German Treaty on Economic, 
Monetary, and Social Union (GEMSU) was 
signed in Bonn. It was ratified by both German 
parliaments by June 21 and took effect on July 
1, 1990. At this point the East German gov-
ernment gave up all control of its financial and 
monetary policy matters to the Bonn govern-
ment. The West German deutsche mark 
became the legal tender of the East, and the 
Bundesbank in Frankfurt became the only cen-
tral bank. East Germany was forced to convert 
from its socialist system to a social market 
economy with much financial aid and other 
forms of assistance from the Federal Republic 
of Germany (FRG). 
The currency conversion was done at dif-
ferent rates. Financial assets and liabilities were 
converted at a rate of two East German marks to 
one West German deutsche mark. A rate of one-
to-one was given for up to two thousand 
deutsche marks for anyone under fourteen years 
old, four thousand deutsche marks for anyone 
fourteen through fifty-eight, and six thousand 
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deutsche marks for anyone older than fifty-eight. 
Along with the currency conversion came 
another problem - inflation. Easterners 
spending their new deutsche marks on Western 
goods that they could not purchase before 
caused an increase in demand for products, 
which led to an increase in prices - inflation. 
This inflation in turn caused a decrease in 
investment in Germany and made growth dif-
ficult. There was a devaluation of the deutsche 
mark which decreased the value of DM-denom-
inated assets. Inflation was rapid until 1992, 
but in 1993 and 1994 it dropped to 3.9 percent 
and 2.4 percent per year respectively. (Weisfeld) 
The sudden currency conversion, though nec-
essary to bring about speedy reunification, 
turned out to be a drain on the economy of the 
East as prices rose and jobs were lost because 
of decreased investment and low productivity. 
This was an inevitable consequence of mone-
tary union and may have happened even with a 
different plan than the one put into place. 
Integration of the Two Systems 
One of the most important difficulties 
associated with unification was the integration 
of the vastly different East German economic 
system into that of the West. This would not be 
an easy task after 45 years of separate rule. 
Changes needed to be made in the areas of busi-
ness, employment, living standards, and the 
banking system. 
Mter reunification, economists around the 
world discovered the horrible conditions actu-
ally present in the former CDR. Realizing that 
the businesses and industries, with low wages 
and productivity and little capital stock, were 
not on a par with those in the West, they con-
cluded that something had to be done or the 
East would crumble. The solution seemed to 
be to privatize East German firms in order to 
bring them into the capitalist system and try to 
make them competitive with the rest of the 
world. In order to achieve this industrial equal-
ity, Jrolf suggested that "the unprivatized 
firms ... require[d] a three-stage transformation 
process that consist[ed] of stabilization, adap-
tation, and a radical new product or production 
development to establish a competitive position 
in the new market economy." (Jrolf, p. 27) 
Workers in the East were one of the 
groups most affected by reunification. They had 
a choice between migration to the West, early 
retirement, or retraining by the government. 
Many workers chose migration because wages 
in the East were only one-third to one-half the 
level of wages in the West, and employment was 
difficult to find as many East German firms 
closed down.(Andersen, p. 125) The problem 
was that many of those who left the East were 
young, skilled workers who would be the best 
hope for building the new economy. In all , 
between the autumn of 1989 and the autumn 
of 1990, approximately 600,000 people migrat-
ed from East to West. (Hall and Ludwig, p. 31) 
Instead of migrating to the West, some 
unemployed workers chose early retirement. 
This was also not very healthy for the Eastern 
economy because it meant that there were even 
more people depending on the government for 
care. Lastly, the government offered occupa-
tional retraining programs to employees who 
were laid off. These programs were a good idea 
in theory as long as the programs were well-run 
and well-thought-out and the workers were 
trained in the right areas - areas where 
employment was available and workers were 
needed. Unfortunately, most of these programs 
were not training people in skills that were 
needed for the job openings available, and con-
sequently many people coming out of them 
could not find jobs. According to Professor 
Dennis Snower, an economist at the University 
of London, "Government training programs are 
standardized, whereas companies need special-
ized, idiosyncratic skills. Thus many workers 
who go through job-training schemes still don't 
get hired." (Ingrassia, p. A14) 
The goal of the Treuhand, the state agency 
in charge of privatizing business and industry, 
was to stabilize the economy and bring capital-
ism to the East. This would not be an easy task. 
As of the end of 1995, the Treuhand had helped 
to privatize 14,000 state-owned East German 
companies. (Steinmetz, p. A6) Also, about 
870,000 new private business have been estab-
lished in the East since reunification. (Menke-
Gllickert, p. 39) Many of the firms being pri-
vatized are being bought by foreigners or West 
Germans. However, investment in the East has 
been relatively slow because investors are cau-
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tious about taking the risk. Some factors that 
have inhibited private investment so far are: 
• a poor infrastructure; 
• the difficulty of finding land and 
buildings in East Germany because 
of legal problems with former own-
ers trying to claim their land; 
• red tape (when trying to obtain per-
mits, etc.); 
• financial problems that Eastern 
companies which have been taken 
over may have had previously and 
not addressed (especially environ-
mental problems); 
• rapid wage increases; 
• uncertainties in regard to Eastern 
Europe. (Andersen, pp. 126-27) 
The government is trying to spur further invest-
ment by giving tax incentives and other subsi-
dies, but other investment stimuli need to be 
found in order to attract more investors. 
Unfortunately, Germany has been investing 
more money outside of its borders than foreign 
countries have been investing in Germany. In 
1994, for example, German companies invest-
ed 18 billion marks ($12.5 billion) abroad while 
foreign companies invested only 5 billion marks 
in Germany. (Ingrassia, p. A14) In the first nine 
months of 1995, German companies invested 
26 billion marks abroad. (Templeman, p. 46) 
Many German companies have been investing 
abroad rather than within Germany because of 
overregulation of business and rigid union work 
rules. As more companies have expanded 
abroad and shut down operations in Germany, 
unemployment of German workers has 
increased. With German unemployment so 
high and the standard of living in East Germany 
so low, Germans must realize that to improve 
their country they need to put money into it. 
Even with substantial economic assistance 
from the West, the East still has many hurdles 
to overcome. West German capital stock is 
somewhat outdated, but the capital stock in the 
East is in far worse shape. Also, productivity in 
the East is only about one-third that in the 
West. (Reier, p. 43) Ea~terners and Westerners 
alike would much rather buy superior Western 
goods than over-priced Eastern ones. Because 
of this, the East faces difficulties expanding its 
industrial base. 
Transportation and environmental prob-
lems have also plagued East Germany. First, 
the roads of the East were not built to handle 
the kind of traffic that would be coming from 
the West. New roads will have to be built, and 
old ones will have to be upgraded and widened. 
(Cole, p. 3) Also, the railroads either need to be 
revamped or closed to the excessive traffic that 
has come into the East since reunification. 
Secondly, before unification the East had very 
low environmental standards. Many of the 
industries have to "clean up their acts," which 
is going to be very costly. Lignite, a very dirty 
fossil fuel, was used in the former CDR for 70 
percent of domestic heating and electricity. 
(Cole, p. 4) Also, the East wasted considerable 
energy because of its antiquated industrial and 
private facilities used for electricity and heat-
ing, low efficiency, badly insulated homes, and 
subsidized low power rates making it not worth 
saving energy because the price was so low 
(Schurig, Greenpeace). Other environmental 
problems in the East are highly polluted soil 
and water. All told, it is estimated that it will 
cost 100 billion U.S. dollars to clean up East 
Germany. (Cole, p. 4) 
Still, the process of unification has 
brought with it many bright spots also. 
According to John Hall, a professor of 
Economics and International Studies at 
Portland State University, and Udo Ludwig, a 
Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for 
Economic Research in Halle, Germany, "East 
German families are benefiting from rising fam-
ily incomes and enjoying substantial increases 
in their bundle of consumer goods with greater 
choice." (Hall and Ludwig, p. 26) There is also 
"greater stability" in the economy and politics 
in the East because it is now under the eco-
nomic and political system of the West. 
Moreover, East German citizens can rest easy 
knowing that the social welfare system of West 
Germany is always ready to help them if they 
should experience economic difficulties. (Hall 
and Ludwig, p. 26) Hall and Ludwig also find 
the future to be promising. Labor productivi-
ty in East Germany increased 20 percent from 
the time of reunification to 1994, and output in 
East Germany is also increasing. (Hall and 
Ludwig, p. 26) Unfortunately, however, the 
growth rate of the unified German economy is 
still low. In 1994, the growth rate of the econ-
omy was only 2.9 percent, in 1995 1.9 percent, 
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and German economics minister Gunter 
Rexrodt predicts growth of less than 2 percent 
for 1996. (Reuters, p. 02) Rexrodt blames the 
slowdown of the economy on an overvalued 
mark, wage hikes, and rising taxes. 
(Templeman, p. 46) 
Financing From the West 
Another major problem with unification 
was that it was enormously costly. Because the 
East was poor and run down, the only obvious 
source of financing was West Germany. It was 
estimated in 1989 that about 100 billion OM per 
year would be needed to eventually bring the 
East up to the level of the West. In 1990, the 
government deficit rose by 7 4 billion OM com-
pared to a rise of only eight billion OM in 1989. 
(Andersen, p. 129) This difference in the year-
ly deficits means that about 66 billion of the 
1990 deficit can be attributed to transfers to the 
East or other financial costs of reunification. 
According to the Economist, the West sent OM 
170 billion to the East in 1991. ("Germany," p. 
Survey 5) All told, transfer payments since 
reunification have averaged about 150 billion 
OM per year from 1990 until 1994. (Menke-
Gli.ickert, p. 39) These transfer payments have 
gone to upgrade infrastructure in the East, to 
act as investment to stimulate growth, and to 
pay for other programs such as unemployment 
insurance, pensions, health care, and welfare. 
It has been estimated that it will take ten to fif-
teen years to raise Eastern living standards to 
those of the West. 
There are three ways of raising money to 
finance the East's recovery. The German gov-
ernment can increase its debt, cut expenditures 
in the West, or increase taxes. The first method 
tried was deficit spending, which caused infla-
tion and decreased investment. Finding this 
method unsatisfactory, the Kohl-Genscher 
coalition government decided that it had to 
raise taxes. In March 1991 an "Eastern Recovery 
Program" was designed in order to help the 
East solve the major problems that came to 
light with unification- inflation, high labor 
costs, low production, unemployment, and the 
inequality of living standards between the East 
and the West. An income tax surcharge of 7.5 
percent was put into place; but despite the high-
er taxes, public borrowing made the deficit even 
worse. Many Germans complain about the high 
level of income taxes ("Germany," p. Survey 10), 
a complaint which has some merit since 47 per- . 
cent of the average worker 's paycheck goes 
toward taxes. (Weinberger, p. 35) 
The continuing costs in Germany, stem-
ming from efforts to raise the standard of liv-
ing, building and transportation construction, 
welfare support, and unemployment payments 
combined with a high government deficit, make 
tax cuts almost impossible. Germany's public 
debt has been growing rapidly since reunifica-
tion. In 1989, the debt was 43.2 percent of GOP, 
and by 1994 debt had grown to 53.2 percent of 
GDP. (Weisfeld) Jarausch explains that FRG cit-
izens do not like supporting the East. He states 
that "prosperous FRG citizens resented paying 
the costs or showed patronizing sympathy." 
(Jarausch, p. 204) 
Many Easterners, on the other hand, were 
expecting to immediately have living standards 
on a par with those of West Germany as a result 
of reunification. Westerners did not feel this was 
fair given that it took them four decades of hard 
work following the Second World War to reach 
the level at which they were living. It did not 
seem fair that the East should immediately ben-
efit from the achievements of the West. Still, 
according to the Basic Law, the constitution of 
Western Germany enacted after WWII , all 
Germans should be treated equally. This made 
it necessary for the West to transfer money to 
the East. (Jarausch, p. 205) Also, the fact that 
so much Western money had to go East meant 
that less was left for government spending on 
Western problems and loans for Western indus-
tries. This fact also angered many Westerners. 
High taxes and increased deficit spending 
both work to decrease investment in Germany, 
which in turn makes growth difficult. Included 
among recent government and industry rec-
ommendations to assist the unified German 
economy are a decrease in both deficit spend-
ing and taxes. These actions should decrease 
inflation and interest rates and spur investment 
and growth. 
Effects on the European Community 
The unification of the two Germanies 
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caught the European community by surprise as 
much as it did everyone else. A united 
Germany, it seemed, would be even more pow-
erful than West Germany alone. But West 
Germany was already a powerful part of the 
European Community and losing it would be a 
disaster for the EC. Therefore, the acceptance 
of a unified Germany into the European 
Community as soon as possible was very impor-
tant so that Germany did not ignore the EC or 
try to "go it alone." This might have caused the 
European Community to crumble. 
According to Robert Livingston, member-
ship in the European Community is very impor-
tant to Germany, second only to reunification. 
The most important buyer of German exports 
is the EC. In fact, the European Community 
bought almost 47.9 percent of German exports 
in 1993 while the United States bought only 7.7 
percent. Germany also imports a great deal 
from the European Community. Of all 
Germany's imports, 46.4 percent in 1993 were 
from the EC compared to 7.3 percent from the 
United States. (National Trade Data Bank) Also, 
Germany sees the European Community "as an 
instrument to lend the German voice greater 
force, " because a unified Germany would have 
many more people than any of the other impor-
tant EC countries. (Livingston, pp. 168-69) 
East Germany, unlike the other countries of the 
Eastern bloc, was lucky in that it had West 
Germany and the European Community to fall 
back on in its time of economic and political 
reorganization. Mter the collapse of Comecon, 
a trading arrangement between the Soviet 
Union and the countries of the Eastern 
European bloc, there was a disappearance of the 
markets for East German goods. With its inte-
gration into West Germany and the European 
Community, East Germany now had a new set 
of markets. Unfortunately for the other coun-
tries of Eastern Europe, a new set of trading 
partners was not available. A big question for 
the European Community, therefore , was 
whether it would be strong enough to allow the 
poorer countries of Eastern Europe to join. 
Offering membership to these countries would 
mean that the Western members of the 
Community would be left to support these 
countries, just as West Germany had to support 
East Germany. 
Another problem Germany has had to face 
is that the other countries of the European 
Community fear that Germany is spending too 
much time and money trying to solve the prob-
lems in Eastern Europe. Of all of the aid that 
has gone to Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union from the western countries since 
1989, more than half has come from Germany. 
Also, Germany is the biggest foreign investor in 
these two regions. ("Germany," p. Survey 17) 
This means that Germany is giving consider-
able amounts of money to Eastern Europe to 
help improve that region's economies and liv-
ing standards, money which the European 
Community feels would be better spent in the 
Community. On the other hand, Germany is 
trying to urge the inclusion of other countries 
into the EC. These countries include Austria, 
Finland, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland, and the three Baltics. (Livingston, p. 
169) Germany also wants free and open trad-
ing practices for EC countries with the rest of 
the world. This is a positive move for the United 
States, Japan, and other countries which are not 
a part of the European Community but who 
wish to trade with the countries of the EC. 
The European Community is also trying 
to establish a common European currency. 
This is a difficult task because all of the coun-
tries in the EC have different exchange rates 
and interest rates. But as a result of German 
monetary unification, the European 
Community now has a model to study and ana-
lyze. Jarausch has stated that "German unity 
would accelerate European integration. " 
(Jarausch, p. 132) This is so since the German 
case is just a small-scale example of what the 
countries of Europe still must do to make suc-
cessful the unification of their economic sys-
tems into a single European market. 
The main effect of the unification of 
Germany on the European Community, how-
ever, is that a more powerful Germany is now 
urging more change in Europe. With the col-
lapse of communism, Germany 's location 
between the East and the West puts it in a dif-
ficult position; for it is now part of both the 
world of the newly growing East and the devel-
oped West. Germany is trying to compromise 
and make the European Community compro-
mise with it by trading with both the East and 
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the West and by using its influence to help 
bring the Eastern countries into the European 
Community. The new, more powerful Germany 
is a healthy addition to the EC because its econ-
omy will be predominant in the economic and 
monetary union of Europe, while at the same 
time Germany will also try to use its influence 
to bring about changes that it sees as necessary. 
Effects on the International 
Community 
The international community was caught 
off guard by the rapid changes that took place 
in Eastern Europe when the Soviet Union col-
lapsed and communism was destroyed. These 
changes have affected savings, investment, and 
GNP in economies all over the world. Also, 
trade has been and will be seriously affected by 
the events in Eastern Europe and Germany. 
Before unification, East Germany's trade was 
predominately (70 percent) with the other 
Comecon countries. With the disappearance of 
Comecon, the East has had to find new trading 
partners or try to keep trade with its Eastern 
partners alive. As Eastern European economies, 
including East Germany, transformed from cen-
trally-planned economies to market economies, 
their trade with the European Community has 
increased. The new, bigger Germany will be a 
better trading partner in the future when 
Eastern enterprises are brought up to the level 
of those in the West and are more productive 
and efficient. As for now, East German goods 
are expensive and the products from the East 
are not of high quality. The new trading pat-
terns that will emerge are more Western trade 
with Eastern Europe and Russia, trade which it 
is hoped will help to speed growth there. 
Another problem stemming from the uni-
fication of Germany that affects many less devel-
oped countries is that aid money from the West 
is being diverted from them and going to East 
Germany and Eastern Europe. Many countries 
in South and Central America and Africa are 
badly in need of economic assistance, and some 
even resent the fact that their needs are being 
neglected by the more developed countries from 
whom they are used to receiving aid. 
German foreign policy has not changed 
drastically as a result of unification. The new 
policy involves multilateralism (cooperating 
and working with many other countries), main-
taining stability in Germany and around the 
world, and using the lessons that West Germany 
learned during the 40 years of separation from 
East Germany in order to have good relations 
with Eastern Europe and Russia. (Livingston, 
p. 170) Germany will maintain the friendships 
that it has built up over the years with the great 
powers of Great Britain, France, and the United 
States; and it will work to support the United 
Nations. (Livingston, p. 165) Public interest in 
the international arena is limited in that the 
German citizens see the huge task they have of 
building their own country and are not as inter-
ested in international problems. It is expected 
that the united Germany's foreign policy will 
simply follow the past policy of the former 
Western Germany. (Livingston, p. 165) 
Germany is also still very much involved in 
NATO, whose purpose has changed now that the 
communist threat is gone. Germany's immense 
role in the management of change in Eastern 
Europe and its growing political clout and power 
make it a leader in the new NATO. Supervising 
the transformation of Eastern Europe is impor-
tant for all of Europe, particularly the West, 
because the changes there will affect the West 
in its domestic and international policies. 
The international community and 
Germany itself were affected more, it seems, by 
the changes around Germany than by the 
changes in Germany. The major effect of reuni-
fication was the larger, more powerful Germany 
that will continue to grow in strength and gain 
the respect of many countries. 
Conclusion 
Germany in 1996 is still working out all of 
the problems of unification that have been pre-
viously discussed. Unemployment and inflation 
in the East are still high. Most East German 
businesses and industries have been privatized, 
and many have been taken over by foreigners 
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or West German firms. Easterners are adapt-
ing to the social market economy and their 
newly found freedoms. Environmental prob-
lems are slowly being cleaned up; the small vol-
ume of investment in East Germany is gradu-
ally increasing productivity, making output 
comparable to that in the West; and slowly but 
surely the standard of living in the East is 
increasing. The people of the West are still 
being highly taxed and the German foreign debt 
is growing, but Germany as a whole is becom-
ing more powerful in international politics. 
The major burden of unification has fall-
en on three different groups. The first group is 
that of workers in both the East and West. 
Workers in the East have had to deal with high 
prices and high unemployment, while workers 
in the West have had to cope with high taxes, 
money transfers to the East, and the migration 
of Easterners to the land that the Westerners 
considered theirs. The second group that has 
had to deal with the major burden of unifica-
tion is that of Germany's European neighbors, 
as the East was integrated into the European 
Union and German aid money was spent in East 
Germany instead of Western and Eastern 
Europe. The third group upon which the major 
burden of reunification has fallen is the future 
generation. This group will suffer because of 
the debt that is being accumulated now. 
Eventually this debt will have to be paid. 
The unification of Germany was an impor-
tant step taken by both German governments 
in 1989. This move caused a great upheaval in 
the lives of both the East and West Germans and 
in the lives of people all over the world. As 
Germany continues its construction of build-
ings, industries, roads, and other important 
structures in the East, more money will have 
to be transferred from West to East. Still more 
businesses must be privatized and investment 
will have to increase before the West and East 
can become comparable. Even so, the hard 
work and sacrifice is paying off as Germany 
again becomes a great world power. 
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